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Multidimensional Poverty in Indonesia: Trends, Interventions 
and Lesson Learned*) 
Sudarno Sumarto and Wenefrida Widyanti**) 
Summary 
 
Despite the Government of Indonesia’s commitment to address 
human security as stated in its ambitious medium-term development plan and 
the Millennium Development Goals, poverty in its multidimensionality remain a 
major issue in Indonesia as a significant proportion of the Indonesian 
population is still consumption poor. Whilst the number of the poor has been 
decreasing consistently since 2002, most of those escaping poverty are still 
vulnerable and just a small shock can send them quickly below the poverty 
line. Using the PPP $2/day poverty line as a vulnerability measure, the World 
Bank (2006) found that 45% of Indonesians remain vulnerable to poverty. 
Nonconsumption poverty is even more problematic which includes 
malnutrition, maternal health, and access to basic services. For example, a 
quarter of children below the age of five are malnourished, only about 72% of 
births are accompanied by skilled birth attendants, 45% of poor households 
have no access to sanitation, more than half have no access to safe water, 
and around 20% of children from these households do not continue to junior 
secondary school. 
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The current state of Indonesian multidimensional poverty can be traced 
back to the time of the economic crisis that struck Indonesia in mid-1997. 
Before the onset of the crisis, Indonesia was one of the fastest growing 
economies in the world. This rapid growth had generated an unprecedented 
reduction in poverty within a remarkably short period of time. In mid-1997, 
after nearly a quarter of a century of rapid growth and welfare gains, a 
currency crisis struck Indonesia, and by early 1998 the country was suffering 
from the combined effects of financial, economic, and political crises.  
The social impact of the crisis was enormous. The national poverty rate 
soared 13 percentage points in the period of 1996–1998, implying that an 
additional 22.5 million people were pushed into absolute poverty (BPS 1999) 
due to the crisis. More than half of the increase in poverty during the crisis 
was due to an increase in chronic poverty. The crisis primarily affected the 
poor and vulnerable nonpoor through falling real wages and a large increase 
in the prices of basic commodities. The economic crisis that threw millions of 
Indonesians into poverty had forced the Government of Indonesia to launch 
social safety nets (as social protection programs were largely based on 
informal arrangements) to help the poor and newly poor cope with the impact 
of the economic crisis. The programs covered employment creation, 
education, health, food security, and community empowerment. 
A decade after the crisis, as the economy slowly recovers and welfare 
has stabilized around precrisis levels, the government has redesigned several 
of these programs and discontinued others. Throughout this latter postcrisis 
period, the government also implemented a range of new social protection 
programs to replace highly regressive fuel subsidies. The new programs have 
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included unconditional cash transfers, school operational assistance, and 
community-driven development programs. These programs are designed to 
promote movement of poor households out of poverty and to prevent nonpoor 
households from falling into poverty. Some progress has been made in 
addressing multidimensional poverty in Indonesia but more must still be done, 
including a greater focus placed on inclusive economic growth.  
This paper first describes the current state of multidimensional poverty 
in Indonesia. It then briefly outlines the characteristics of several major 
programs designed to address multidimensional poverty, both during and after 
the crisis, and describes their implementation problems and likely impacts. 
Finally, it details the lessons which can be applied to future targeted social 
protection programs to address human security in Indonesia. 
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I. Introduction 
Before the onset of the economic crisis in mid-1997, Indonesia was one 
of the fastest growing economies in the world. This rapid growth had 
generated an unprecedented reduction in poverty within a remarkably short 
period of time. Based on the official figures, between 1976 and 1996, absolute 
poverty fell by around 29 percentage points (BPS 2006), accompanied by 
substantial gains in education and health standards. In the first half of the 
1990s GDP grew at an average annual rate of 7%, and the poverty rate had 
fallen dramatically from 15.1% in 1990 to 11.3% by 1996.  
In mid-1997, after nearly a quarter of a century of rapid growth and 
welfare gains, a currency crisis struck Indonesia, and by early 1998 the 
country was suffering from the combined effects of financial, economic, and 
political crises. Within one year, the value of the rupiah fell by 85%, domestic 
prices soared by 78%, nominal food prices increased threefold, and the 
economy contracted by almost 14%. The social impact of the crisis was 
enormous. The national poverty rate soared 13 percentage points in the 
period of 1996–1998, implying that an additional of 22.5 million people were 
pushed into absolute poverty (BPS 1999) due to the crisis. 
A decade after the crisis, Indonesia’s economic condition is in much 
better shape, though in the period of 2005–2006 there was a net increase of 
four million poor people (or about 1.78 percentage point) within a year, 
reaching a total of 39 million and bucking a four-year trend in poverty 
reduction. In the last one year, from 2006 to 2007, there was a slight decrease 
of poverty rate for about 1.17 percentage point or about 2.13 million people 
moved out of poverty. However, the level of the decrease in that period is still 
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lower than the previous increase. In percentage terms, this condition is back 
to the precrisis level, but in absolute terms, it is still higher than the precrisis 
level. Therefore, it can be seen that poverty remains a crucial issue in 
Indonesia.  
Aside from a declining trend of consumption-based poverty indicated 
in recent years, there are also improvements indicated in nonconsumption 
poverty, such as infant mortality rate, enrollment rate particularly for 
elementary education, and life expectancy at birth. In many aspects, however, 
nonconsumption poverty is still more of a serious problem than consumption-
based poverty. Malnutrition rates, for instance, are high and have even risen 
in recent years: a quarter of children below the age of five are malnourished in 
Indonesia. As in the case of malnutrition, the condition of maternal health is 
worse than comparable countries in the region: based on 2002-2003 
Demographics and Health Survey (DHS), Indonesia’s maternal mortality rate 
(307 deaths in 100,000 births) is three times that of Vietnam and six times that 
of China and Malaysia; only about 72% of births are accompanied by skilled 
birth attendants (World Bank 2006). 
The various degrees of success in poverty reduction may correlate to 
the types of efforts that have been taken place as a response to the negative 
impact of the crisis, particularly high poverty and vulnerability. As was 
reported by Sumarto et al (2002), starting in 1998, the central government 
brought about numerous social programs targeted at the poor, and has set up 
a number of new initiatives in the last five years. These programs take up a 
significant proportion of the government's budget. Moreover, social protection 
is still particularly relevant as the government takes steps to correct 
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inefficiencies prevalent in the economy, mostly in the form of regressive 
subsidies and over zealous trade protection regulations. Recognizing this, the 
government has been increasing its spending on social protection programs 
and experimenting with new schemes. One of these is the conditional cash 
transfer—a novel social protection system— that has seen enormous success 
in Mexico which then spread rapidly to other Latin American countries.1 The 
conditional cash transfer, which is known as Program Keluarga Harapan, is 
being piloted in seven provinces in Indonesia. 
These aforementioned attempts are essential, not merely for poverty 
reduction purposes, but also to promote human security. It is understood, that 
human security has become an international concern. The emphasis on 
human security was taken by the UNDP in the 1994 Human Development 
Report with its insuring “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear” 
argument for all people in tackling the problem of global insecurity. In that 
report, the definition of human security is expanded to include threats in seven 
areas: (i) economic security; (ii) food security; (iii) health security; (iv) 
environmental security; (v) personal security; (vi) community security; and (vii) 
political security. In addition, human security is “people-centered” and focuses 
on human individuals and their communities worldwide, regardless of gender, 
race, religion, ethnicity, citizenship, or other distinguished characteristics. 
The grand design of a human security oriented poverty reduction 
strategy, therefore, suggests a scheme of social safety net programs such as 
an emergency funds and food-for-work program that are adopted when 
people face risks. Furthermore, such sustainable social protection programs, 
                                                 
1
 In Colombia, the poverty rate decreased by 6%. School participation increased by 8% in 
Mexico, 13% in Colombia, and 22% in Nicaragua (Alatas 2007). 
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particularly for those who are poor and vulnerable, should be taken into 
consideration in the poverty reduction strategy.  
Given the fact that millions of poor people depend on those programs, 
it is imperative that lessons are learned to ensure that subsequent programs 
are improved and targeted to the needs of the Indonesian people. On a global 
level, the experiences of Indonesia might provide insights for other developing 
countries as they implement their own social protection programs. 
The second section of this paper provides a description of the 
evolution of targeted social programs for reducing poverty in Indonesia. It 
starts by outlining the characteristics of each program and then discusses the 
results of an impact evaluation study conducted by The SMERU Research 
Institute, the University of Indonesia, and the World Bank. In addition, this 
section also provides a description about ongoing and upcoming social 
protection programs, as well as enhancement of the previous social protection 
programs. This section also includes a review of the impact of the latest 
interventions. The final section of this paper lists the lessons learned and how 
they might benefit similar programs in the future. 
II. The Current State of Multidimensional Poverty in Indonesia 
In the aftermath of the economic crisis in Indonesia, poverty increased 
dramatically from 17.47% in 1996 to 23.4% by 1999. However, the poverty 
rate then gradually decreased during the period of 1999 to 2005. 
Nevertheless, due to the high increase of world fuel prices in 2005, poverty 
increased again. In a year, the poverty rate increased by 1.8 percentage point 
or about 4.2 million people fell into poverty between 2005 and 2006. After 
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some policy adjustments and macroeconomic stabilization, poverty in 2007 
fell slightly and in relative terms, poverty in 2007 was back to the precrisis 
level. However, in absolute terms, poverty was still higher than the precrisis 
period, due to the relatively high population growth. Indonesia’s consumption-
based poverty figures in the period of 1996 to 2007 are illustrated in Figure 1. 
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Source: BPS 2006  
Figure 1. Poverty Head Count and Number of Poor in Indonesia,  
1996-2007 
Whilst the number of the poor had been decreasing since 2002, most 
of those escaping poverty are still vulnerable and just a small shock can send 
them quickly below the poverty line. Nonetheless, such interventions to those 
who are slightly below poverty line may help them to move out of poverty. It 
means that vulnerability to poverty in Indonesia remains high. This can be 
seen by using the PPP $2/day as poverty line for vulnerability measure, the 
World Bank (2006) found that close to 42% of Indonesia’s population who 
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lives between PPP $1 and PPP $2/day remain vulnerable to poverty (Figure 
2). 
 
Source: World Bank (2006) 
 
Figure 2. Close to 42% of Indonesia’s population lives on between PPP 
US$1- and US$2-a-day  
 
The high poverty and vulnerability figures based on consumption are 
also confirmed by the nonconsumption poverty measures. The 
nonconsumption indicators indicate that the poor are widely deprived of public 
services access, such as health and education. Based on the 2004 National 
Socioeconomic Survey (Susenas), Figure 3 shows that many poor 
households experience lack of access to public services, such as lack of 
access to sanitation (44.4%); many rely on traditional assistance when 
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delivering birth (44.4%), have no access to safe water (57.5%), and do not 
send their children to continue schooling at junior secondary level (28.2%). 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Susenas Core 2004 data 
Figure 3. Nonconsumption Poverty Indicators, 2004 
Furthermore, it is well-known that Indonesia is a highly diverse country. 
Thus, the high disparity in poverty is also important to note. As illustrated by 
Figure 4, in percentage terms, it can be seen that the Eastern part of 
Indonesia is prominently noted for its higher poverty rates than other parts of 
the country. Whilst in absolute terms, the high number of poor people is found 
in many provinces in Java Island (Figure 5).  
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Source: World Bank (2006) 
Figure 4. Regional Disparity of Poverty in Indonesia (%), 2004 
 
Source: World Bank (2006) 
Figure 5. Regional Disparity of Poverty in Indonesia (Absolute Number), 
2004 
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In addition, based on the UNDP Human Development Indicator (HDI),2 
Indonesia’s HDI value of 0.728 was ranked 107 out of 177 countries in 2005. 
This rank is only one level higher than the previous year, where Indonesia 
was ranked 108. However, it should be taken into consideration that the index 
is not such a comprehensive measure of human development. It does not, for 
instance, include important indicators such as income or gender inequality, 
and more difficult indicators such as respects for human rights and political 
freedom (UNDP 2007/2008). 
Inequality is another concern aside from poverty. Figure 6, which 
shows inequality in access to services or facilities, confirms the fact illustrated 
previously in Figure 3 that people who are less well off have lower access to 
services. It can be seen that the percentages of poor people who have access 
to piped water as a main source of drinking water and private toilet with septic 
tank facility remain very low. 
 
Source: World Bank (2006) 
Figure 6. Inequality in Access to Services Remains High 
 
                                                 
2
 The UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) provides a composite measure of three 
dimensions of human development: living a long and healthy life (measured by life 
expectancy), being educated (measured by adult literacy and enrollment at the primary, 
secondary, and tertiary levels), and having a decent standard of living (measured by 
purchasing power parity income). 
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III. The Evolution of Indonesia’s Targeted Social Programs to 
Address Multidimensional Poverty 
General improvements in the macroeconomic environment are 
necessary to reduce poverty and also vulnerability among the nonpoor; 
however, they are not always sufficient. Macroeconomic upturns are, in most 
circumstances, quite insufficient to lift the chronic poor from the depths of 
poverty. In order to reduce the adverse socioeconomic impact of the crisis, 
therefore, starting in 1998, the Government of Indonesia (GoI) launched a 
number of social safety net (SSN) programs—called Jaring Pengaman Sosial 
or JPS—that aimed to prevent the chronic poor from falling more deeply into 
poverty and to reduce the exposure of vulnerable households to risk.  
The JPS involved four strategies: (i) ensuring the availability of 
affordable food; (ii) improving household purchasing power through 
employment creation; (iii) preserving access to critical social services, 
particularly health and education; and (iv) sustaining local economic activity 
through regional block grants and the extension of small-scale credits. It was 
hoped that the implementation of the JPS programs would prevent or at least 
significantly reduce the worst effects of the crisis.  
Without a clear institutional precedent, policy makers faced the 
challenging task of undertaking these social interventions amidst severe 
political instability and an increasingly unfriendly fiscal environment. In July 
1998, with financial support from international donors that included the World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank, the Indonesian government allocated 
Rp3.9 trillion directly to JPS programs out of a total development budget of 
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Rp14.2 trillion.3 The JPS programs covered education, health, community 
empowerment and employment creation, in addition to the rice subsidy 
program known as Operasi Pasar khusus or OPK. The magnitude of this 
social protection initiative was quite unprecedented in Indonesian history. The 
summary of the social protection programs during the crisis period is provided 
in Table 1.  
Table 1. Descriptions of Social Protection Programs in the Crisis Period  
Program Description of Benefits Coverage Likely impact 
OPK (subsidized 
rice) 
Sales of subsidized 
rice 
12.8 million KPS 
& KS I 
households 
Households which 
participated in 
subsidized rice have 3% 
lower probability to be 
poor 
Padat Karya 
(employment 
creation) 
‘Labor intensive’ 
programs across 
variety of government 
departments 
12.7 million 
person-days 
Increased income for 
participated households 
and reduced probability 
to be poor 
SBG 
(scholarships 
and block grants 
to schools) 
Scholarships for 
elementary, lower 
secondary, and upper 
secondary students. 
Block grants to 
selected schools 
6% of primary, 
17% of lower 
secondary, 10% 
of upper 
secondary 
school students, 
60% of schools 
 The scholarships for 
students enable them 
to stay in schools 
 The block grants to 
schools helped them 
to continue operating 
SSN-BK (health 
cards) 
Subsidies for medical 
services, operational 
support for health 
centers, medicine and 
imported medical 
equipment, family 
planning services, 
supplemental food, 
and midwives’ 
services 
7.4 million KPS 
households 
SSN-BK program 
increased access to 
health services and 
household consumption 
levels, except nutrition 
PDM-DKE 
(community 
empowerment) 
Block grants for 
villages for public 
works or revolving 
funds for credit 
Almost all 
villages in the 
country 
Households which 
participated in 
subsidized credit have 
higher probability to be 
poor  not suitable as a 
crisis program 
Source: SMERU’s various presentation files. 
                                                 
3
 The average exchange rate around this time period was approximately Rp10,000 to the US 
dollar.  
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Drawing lessons from the JPS programs, policy makers and 
researchers are attempting to create a more efficient, equitable, and coherent 
social protection policy. The aim is not merely to provide risk-coping 
mechanisms in response to crises but also to institute sustainable programs 
that will enable the children of the poor to move out of poverty permanently. 
While the targeting of the JPS programs has been called into question by 
numerous researchers, social welfare would not have recovered in such a 
relatively short time without these kinds of programs. The JPS programs and 
its aftermath have since helped to maintain these postcrisis gains despite 
periodic bouts of economic fluctuations and, more importantly, have enabled 
the central government to make the transition to a more progressive public 
spending regime. Today, however, Indonesia’s budgetary allocations to social 
and human development priorities as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) still remain among the lowest in Southeast Asia, and its policy makers 
face a critical trade-off between further assisting the state budget and making 
necessary social investments. 
During the precrisis high growth period, government-run JPS programs 
had been almost nonexistent in Indonesia. The general antipoverty strategy at 
that time included (i) general social spending on health, family planning, and 
education; (ii) development programs aimed at increasing productivity among 
the poor; and (iii) some small programs for disadvantaged groups, such as the 
handicapped and orphans. There were also mandatory social security and 
health insurance schemes for employees in medium and large enterprises, 
the public service, and the military. These schemes, however, proved largely 
ineffective during the crisis because they excluded most of the population and 
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in particular the poor, as 65% of Indonesian workers can be found in the 
informal sector where compulsory social security schemes do not apply.   
The Indonesian people were not simply passive victims of the crisis. 
They had never relied, to any significant extent, on public safety net programs 
in the past. Instead, they turned to many of their own private coping 
measures. Three main coping strategies were adopted during the crisis: 
reducing expenditures, borrowing, and/or attempting to raise incomes. 
Clothing and recreation expenditures were cut most frequently followed by 
transportation, not to mention reduction in the quality or, in some instances, 
even the quantity of food. Some households maintained expenditures by 
borrowing or selling assets. Meanwhile, households raised incomes by taking 
additional jobs, working longer hours, or increasing the number of family 
members who were working. In fact, children often augmented family income 
by engaging in labor activities in addition to schooling.  
Several researchers have found evidence in Indonesia of what is 
identified as a moral economy in which the distributional outcomes of 
traditional government-run social programs might be achieved through private 
giving between families and within communities. The progressiveness of 
private transfers can be discerned from the fact that nearly 75% of 
households in the poorest quintile received transfers, which is equal to 20% of 
household expenditures. Drawing on the hypothesis that changes in 
consumption among rural households are largely determined by what 
happens to the rest of the village; there is evidence that a partial insurance 
effect among Indonesian households took place during the crisis. The 
household’s own effects, however, dominated community-level changes in 
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income. Village-level income shocks only partially yield lower household 
consumption, which points to the presence of some inter- and/or intra-
household insurance or redistributive mechanism at work. Undoubtedly, this 
“moral economy” complemented official JPS programs in limiting the worst 
effects of the crisis.  
The JPS programs operated in five major sectors: food security, 
employment creation, education, health, and community empowerment. While 
different sectoral ministries and agencies designed and implemented each of 
the programs, the government also established a team specifically tasked with 
monitoring overall implementation. The team was headed by the National 
Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) at the central level and by the 
provincial and district development planning boards (Bappeda) at the local 
level.  
In the food security sector, the government initially introduced a 
subsidized rice program (OPK) in July 1998 to ensure continued access 
among the poor to affordable rice. After a successful pilot program in Jakarta, 
the program was expanded to the rest of the country. The OPK program was 
the largest and arguably the most critical component of the JPS programs 
during the crisis. The initial target population included around 7.4 million 
households or roughly 15% of all households in the country. By far the most 
important commodity for poor households, rice comprises nearly a quarter of 
average monthly expenditures in poor households, contributing 34% and 26% 
to the official rural and urban poverty lines, respectively. By mid-1999, over 
50% of households in all, but the richest quintile, reported receiving OPK rice.  
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The OPK program shared some similarities with traditional commodity 
subsidy programs in other developing countries. As an indirect income 
transfer, the program reduced the price of the largest component of most poor 
households’ monthly expenditures. The OPK “transfer” constituted 9% to 11% 
of total preprogram monthly expenditure of the median participant household. 
Econometric evidence suggests that OPK recipients experienced an increase 
in per capita household consumption that was in the order of 4% higher than 
nonrecipients at similar welfare levels. Although poor households were 
explicitly targeted, the program also had an element of implicit self-selection 
by restricting the quality of OPK rice to that of medium quality rather than the 
higher quality rice traditionally purchased by wealthier households. Neither the 
explicit nor implicit targeting, however, was effective in limiting program 
participation to the poor.  
In mid-2001, when program planners introduced a set of primarily 
cosmetic changes, including the new, somewhat ambitious program, Raskin, 
an acronym for beras untuk keluarga miskin (“rice for poor families”), 20.2 
million households received subsidized rice, nearly double the target 
population, and yet only 52.6% of the poor participated. The Raskin program 
remained the most extensive JPS program through mid-2005. It had not, 
however, been effectively linked to the targeting and administrative apparatus 
of the new JPS framework implemented after the fuel subsidy cut-backs in 
2005. To account for mounting criticism and perhaps the de facto 
distributional incidence, the official eligibility criteria were expanded to include 
both the lowest and the second lowest National Family Planning Board 
(BKKBN) welfare categories up until 2005.  
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Since 2006, however, the program has targeted households 
categorized as poor households (RTM) according to the results of PSE-05 
data (Enumeration of Household’s Socioeconomic Data 2005) that was 
collected by BPS-Statistics Indonesia. As RTM are spread across all 
administrative levels of all regions, the Raskin program operates in all regions, 
without differentiating between regional poverty conditions. In 2007, Raskin 
had targeted the provision of 1.9 tonnes of rice for 15.8 million poor 
households with the total cost of Rp6.28 trillion. Each targeted household 
should receive 10 kilograms of rice each month for Rp1,000 per kilogram at 
the distribution point (Hastuti, forthcoming). In 2008, Raskin is intended to 
cover around 19.1 million RTM or about 3.3 million higher than the intended 
target in 2007. Meanwhile, the unit price of Raskin rice is also increased up to 
Rp1,600 per kilogram.  
A large component of the JPS was the employment creation program 
known as Padat Karya, which was launched in late 1997 and funded primarily 
through the state budget to a total of Rp2.1 billion. Although some 
employment creation programs were targeted to specific areas, particularly to 
hard-hit urban areas during the initial stage of the crisis, there was a notable 
lack of implementation guidelines. To the extent that there was household 
targeting, it was mainly through self-selection as workers chose to work based 
on the going wage rates. There was no fixed minimum wage rate, but in some 
regions the wage rate was actually set higher than the prevailing local wage 
rate, thus inducing those already working to switch jobs or to take additional 
jobs. Despite weak adherence to set wages below the minimum wage, 
households with at least one member participating in the program 
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experienced an increase in per capita consumption approximately 4% higher 
than nonparticipant households. The dynamic benefit incidence of the labor 
programs fared better than other JPS programs in health and education, 
largely due to the self-selection mechanism, which naturally responds to 
welfare changes more effectively than do administratively assigned benefits. 
In this regard, the labor programs may have effectively reached not only the 
chronic poor but also vulnerable near-poor households facing transitory 
shocks. 
Fearing deterioration in public and family health as a result of the crisis, 
the Indonesian government established JPS programs known as JPS-BK 
(JPS Bidang Kesehatan, Health Sector JPS) in the health sector. The 
programs consisted of a targeted consumer price subsidy, nutritional 
supplements, and operational support for public health facilities and village 
midwives’ services. The purpose of these programs was to enable public 
health providers to maintain the quality and availability of services and poor 
households to afford the higher costs of medical services. Based on BKKBN 
criteria, irrespective of health status, eligible poor households received health 
cards, which could be used to obtain medical services at public health clinics, 
free of charge.  
Impact evaluations of the health program produced mixed findings. 
First, targeting was progressive as the poorest two quintiles received nearly 
60% of the health cards. Roughly 18.5% of the poorest quintile received cards 
by comparison with only 3.7% of households in the richest quintile. Despite 
the pro-poor distribution of health cards, the actual utilization of the cards for 
outpatient care was limited by comparison with the number of cards 
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distributed. The low utilization rates among recipients perhaps stemmed from 
the same constraints that the poor face in noncrisis times, such as the high 
cost of time and travel to reach health facilities as well as limited access to 
information regarding health service quality and availability. The high rate of 
underutilization also reflected the weak linkage between the disbursement of 
health cards and the allocation of operational grants. 
Nevertheless, among the poor, the health card program led to 
increased health care utilization and a moderate shift from private to 
subsidized public facilities. For the nonpoor, a similar shift in utilization was 
observed. Quasi-experimental evidence suggests that the operational grants 
had a relatively stronger impact on overall utilization than did the actual 
receipt of health cards. While household recipients of health cards may have 
experienced a 4% increase in consumption relative to similar nonrecipient 
households, the poorest nonrecipients were still demand-constrained and 
hence unable to utilize the expanded health services. In this aggregate sense, 
nearly all of the JPS programs were plagued by undercoverage due to the 
compounding fiscal constraints imposed by the crisis. These constraints 
disproportionately hurt poor households as they had to contend not only with 
leakage but also severe undercoverage in seeking to qualify for participation 
in JPS programs. 
The PDM-DKE program (Program Pemberdayaan Daerah Mengatasi 
Dampak Krisis Ekonomi or Regional Empowerment to Overcome the Impact 
of the Economic Crisis) provided funds to villages across Indonesia. The 
program permitted maximum discretion at the local level with regard to the 
use of funds. The decisions about who benefited were left entirely in the 
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hands of the lowest level village body, that is, the Village Community 
Resilience Institution (Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat DesaLKMD). Since 
the official guidelines on targeting were sufficiently general, almost any 
decision could have been justified as consistent with the program. Since the 
PDM-DKE program had been introduced as a “crisis program”, local officials 
often made decisions without adequate time for a proper public information 
campaign, training of program administrators, and community consensus 
building. In some communities, PDM-DKE appears to have reached the poor 
reasonably effectively, while in other locations the local community had never 
heard of the program, suggesting poor socialization and/or local capture.  
The JPS education program had its origins in government concern that 
parents might withdraw their children from school as a way to cope with falling 
incomes and rising costs. The government responded to the possibility of a 
large increase in attrition rates by establishing an educational funding 
program in the 1998–1999 school year. The program included scholarships 
for students from poor families and block grants for schools to facilitate 
continued operations. Not unlike the Progresa program in Mexico, the JPS 
scholarships provided cash to students from poor households. The 
scholarships covered nearly 8% of average monthly per capita expenditure 
among recipient households in the poorest quintile. Meanwhile, 60% of 
schools in each district were to receive operational grants (DBO), which could 
be used to purchase school materials, make physical repairs, and cover other 
operational costs.   
Although coverage of the poor was rather limited, the scholarship 
program generated welfare improvements at both household and aggregate 
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levels. Household recipients of JPS scholarships experienced a substantial 
increase in consumption almost 10% higher than similar nonrecipient 
households. Despite the severity of the impact that the crisis had on 
household welfare, attrition in large-scale was prevented. Although the JPS 
scholarships reached only 4.96% of all students in primary, junior, and senior 
secondary schools in the first year, strong econometric evidence suggests 
that the program succeeded in returning enrollment to precrisis levels, 
especially for primary school-age children in rural areas. Approximately 13% 
of JPS recipients would have dropped out of school if they had not received 
the scholarship, yielding an increase in overall enrollment of 0.6%. Unlike the 
JPS health programs, though, the demand-side (scholarships) had a larger 
impact on enrollment than did the supply-side (DBO operational grants). By 
raising the reservation wages of poor students, the JPS program reduced the 
use of child labor as a consumption smoothing mechanism in recipient 
households. 
Meanwhile, the JPS scholarship program was progressively targeted in 
all years of operation until 2003. Households in the poorest two quintiles 
received nearly 65% of the scholarships from 2001 to 2003. Since July 2005, 
the JPS scholarship has been enhanced and experienced some changes in 
terms of target and delivery mechanism. The social protection program in 
education was then transformed into two forms, school operational assistance 
(BOS) for elementary and junior secondary schools and special assistance for 
students (BKM)—such as scholarships that were intended for poor students. 
Moreover, microsimulations suggest that the poor benefited most from 
improved targeting and not simply from program expansion. Nevertheless, the 
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effectiveness of targeting varied widely across districts and particularly across 
educational levels. 
In the years since Soeharto’s fall, successive administrations have 
strongly emphasized poverty reduction. While maintaining some of the JPS 
programs in the years after the crisis, the various governments also attempted 
to restructure the extremely regressive subsidies for certain fuel products 
(mainly kerosene, automotive diesel fuel, and gasoline, known as BBM or 
bahan bakar minyak) and to channel budgetary savings into targeted social 
protection and poverty alleviation programs. On several occasions the 
government, after reducing BBM subsidies, has reallocated a portion of the 
savings to social undertakings known in general as the Fuel Subsidy 
Reduction Compensation Program (Program Kompensasi Pengurangan 
Subsidi Bahan Bakar Minyak or PKPS-BBM).  
In 2005, the fuel subsidy scheme was introduced following the 
economic crisis and the first massive reduction of the subsidy. Annual 
spending on fuel subsidies at that time absorbed nearly 2.9% of GDP (or 
Rp76.5 trillion). In March 2005, the government raised the price of fuel 
products by a weighted average of 29%, and promised to reallocate half of the 
expected savings to a compensation fund worth Rp11 trillion, to be directed to 
health, education, and infrastructure programs. Six months later, the same 
government further slashed the fuel subsidy, extending the reductions to 
premium gasoline, automotive diesel, and household kerosene. 
Consequently, the GoI then decided to again increase the fuel prices and 
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compensate the fuel price subsidy directly to the poor. The latter increase of 
fuel prices was notably high at around 125% in average.4 
 The skyrocketing of fuel prices has led to the increase of other 
commodities. Such potential shock to the general economy and particularly to 
household purchasing power was then clear to policymakers. The challenge 
for the government was to immediately reallocate resources to social 
programs so as to mitigate the impact of the price shocks on welfare. 
In general, therefore, Indonesia's social protection programs can be 
divided into three large groups. Firstly, during the crisis period, the 
government instituted several programs under the umbrella of Social Safety 
Net (SSN) programs. These ranged from subsidized rice, nutritional 
supplements for infants, education scholarships, free health services, and 
employment creation schemes, to community empowerment programs. 
Sumarto, Suryahadi, and Widyanti (2002) reviewed the targeting accuracy of 
these programs and found an average of 35% leakage (the share of program 
benefits that went to nonpoor households) ranging from 70% in the subsidized 
rice program to only 5% in the nutritional supplement program. 
Secondly, as the SSN programs were nearing completion, the 
government merged some of the programs into a new Compensation 
Program for the Reduction in Fuel Subsidy (PKPS-BBM), which was 
implemented between 2001 and 2004. During this period, programs included 
education scholarships, subsidized rice, cash transfer, revolving funds, free 
health service, and community-driven development (CDD).  
                                                 
4
 Percentages of price increase for premium gasoline, automotive diesel, and household 
kerosene were 87.5%, 104.8%, and 185.7% respectively. 
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Finally, in 2005/2006 the government implemented the PKPS-BBM II 
program, which contained many components from PKPS-BBM I but with an 
additional unconditional cash transfer (UCT) component. Following trends in 
other developing countries, the UCT aimed to duplicate the success of an 
unconditional cash transfer program in Mexico, the Progresa/Oportunidades.5 
The next section discusses the characteristics and impact of several 
components of the current PKPS-BBM II program. 
IV. Characteristics and Impacts of Targeted Social Programs 
Prior to the October fuel subsidy reduction, the government had 
allocated Rp5 trillion to education, Rp3 trillion to health, and Rp3 trillion to 
infrastructure. Initial estimates placed the expected savings from the October 
subsidy cut at Rp25 trillion, and the government planned to allocate Rp4.7 
trillion to the first of four quarterly tranches for the transfer program. The 
following part of this section provides details of recently implemented, 
ongoing, and upcoming social protection programs. The details of the targeted 
social programs are summarized in Table 2 and Table 3. In addition, some of 
these programs are then further explained in the following subsections. 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Gertler, Martinez, and Codina (2006); Skoufias and di Maro (2006); and 
IFPRI (2000) for evaluations of Progresa. 
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Source: Summarized from various World Bank projects’ documents and SMERU’s presentations. 
 
 
Table 2. Details of Postcrisis Social Protection Programs 
Program 
Description 
of benefits 
Program 
coverage 
Implementation 
problem 
Likely impact to 
the 
poor/vulnerable 
Rice for the 
poor (Raskin) 
Sales of 
subsidized rice 
Intended to 
cover 15,8 
million 
households in 
2007 
 Socialization to the 
community is still 
weak  
 The program is not 
fully transparent 
 Varying targeting 
accuracy 
Help with food 
expenses, “taking a 
load off the minds” 
of recipients & their 
families, and being 
able to limit price 
fluctuations for rice 
in the local markets 
School 
operational 
assistance 
(BOS) 
School 
operational 
assistance for 
the 9-year 
primary 
education which 
is distributed to 
and managed 
by schools 
July-Dec 2005: 
Rp5.136 trillion 
for 39.6 million 
students 
 Lack of socialization 
& technical training 
particularly for school 
administrator 
 Time lag for the 
distribution of funds 
with the 
commencement of 
the academic 
year/semester 
 Increased the 
availability of 
better equipment 
and teaching 
materials 
 School tuition and 
other school fees 
are reduced or 
even free 
Unconditional 
Cash 
Transfer/UCT 
(BLT) 
Direct cash 
transfer 
(Rp100,000/HH/ 
months) to poor 
and near poor 
households that 
were given 
quarterly for 
one year 
(2005/2006) 
2005/2006 
(started in Oct 
2005): About 
19.2 million 
households 
 Program socialization 
to the public was 
lacking or even 
absent in some 
places 
 Complaint 
resolutions were not 
sufficiently 
accommodated in the 
original program 
design 
 Regional & local 
governments are 
generally unprepared 
to handle a program 
of this scale and in 
such a short 
implementation 
schedule 
 Help the 
beneficiary 
households to 
cope with negative 
shock due to 
reduction in the 
fuel subsidy (it can 
be seen from the 
use of funds, e.g., 
rice or other food 
purchased, school 
fees payment, 
debts payment, 
and getting 
medical treatment) 
Kecamatan 
Development 
Project 
(KDP)/Urban 
Poverty 
Program 
(UPP) 
Block grants to 
eligible 
subdistricts, 
focus on 
community 
participation 
with 2 
components: 
small loans & 
infrastructure 
improvement 
KDP 1998-
2008: 
30 provinces, 
260 districts, 
1,983 
subdistricts, 
34,200 villages 
UPP: 6,600 
urban wards 
and 7.4 million 
beneficiaries  
 Local bureaucracy 
bogs down 
participation 
 Elite capture in 
deciding on 
infrastructure project 
 Overall lack of 
financial 
transparency 
 Insignificant 
community 
involvement in 
maintaining the 
finished projects 
 More than 50% 
cheaper than 
contractor-
executed 
construction 
 Increased 
participation 
 Provided access 
to poor families 
 - 28 - 
Table 3. Details of Ongoing and Upcoming Social Protection Programs 
Program Description Objectives Program Coverage 
Conditional Cash 
Transfer (CCT): 
Community 
 Allocated block grant 
to communities, who 
decide how block 
grants can be best 
used to reach several 
education and health 
targets 
 Conditionality: financial 
incentives to villages 
based on performance 
evaluation of 12 
indicators 
 Village performance 
will be compared with 
other villages in the 
subdistrict at the end 
of program cycle 
 To reduce current 
poverty 
 To reduce maternal 
mortality 
 To reduce child 
mortality 
 To ensure universal 
coverage of basic 
education 
 
The pilot project 
(2007) covered 48 
districts/municipalities 
in seven provinces 
(DKI Jakarta, West 
Java, East Java, West 
Sumatra, North 
Sulawesi, Gorontalo, 
and East Nusa 
Tenggara) 
Conditional Cash 
Transfer (CCT): 
Household (known 
as Program Keluarga 
Harapan/PKH) 
 Applies the traditional 
CCT design with 
quarterly cash 
transfers to individual 
poor households 
identified through 
statistical means 
 Households recipients 
will receive the cash 
transfer through the 
post office as long as 
they meet the 
requirements of using 
specified health and 
education services 
 Health facilities & 
schools will regularly 
report nonuse of their 
services 
 If the HH-CCT 
recipient fails to 
comply with the 
required condition after 
a few warnings, the 
cash transfer will be 
terminated 
The pilot (2007) 
covered 
approximately 
500.000 chronically 
poor households in 
seven provinces 
National Community 
Empowerment 
Program (PNPM) 
The 2007 program still 
100% duplicates KDP 
and UPP, but there will 
be fine-tuning in 2008, 
e.g., regarding the 
maximum government 
contribution to the 
projects (currently 
pegged at 80%) 
To speed up efforts to 
eliminate poverty and 
create job opportunities 
through consolidated 
community 
empowerment 
programs, which so far 
have been conducted 
separately by various 
ministries and state 
institutions  
Targeted to cover all 
kecamatan in 2009. 
Total budget is 
Rp14.3 trillion until 
2009. 
Source: Summarized from various World Bank projects’ documents and SMERU’s presentations. 
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a. Unconditional Cash Transfer (UCT) and Conditional Cash Transfer 
(CCT) 
In October 2005, the Indonesian government launched its most 
ambitious social protection program to date, which is an unconditional cash 
transfer (UCT) program known as Bantuan Langsung Tunai (BLT).6 The BLT 
is a direct cash assistance (Rp100,000/household/month) which was 
disbursed through post offices quarterly in a one year period.  
A household's eligibility was determined based on PSE05 
(Enumeration of Household’s Socioeconomic 2005) data collected by BPS-
Statistics Indonesia by using a district-specific proxy means-testing method 
based on 14 indicators of poverty, including, among others, household size, 
assets, housing characteristics, level of education level of household head, 
and household consumption pattern. An eligible household received a UCT 
card which they used to withdraw the payments from local post offices on a 
given date.  
The first tranche was to reach around 15.5 million households or 
approximately 62 million people. In later tranches, the government expanded 
the number of eligible households to approximately 19.2 million households, 
partly in response to the overwhelming number of supplementary eligibility 
requests. This enormous number of targets made the UCT program the 
largest of its kind in the world. Even so, this program failed to prevent the 
increase of poverty. The national poverty rate increased from 15.97% in 
February 2005 to 17.75% in March 2006.7 
                                                 
6
 The program is sometimes referred to as Program Subsidi Langsung Tunai (SLT or direct 
cash subsidy).   
7
 There is still controversy regarding the real cause of the increase in poverty. Some blame 
the fuel price increase, while some pin the increasing price of rice as the cause. 
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Due to the emergence of social jealousies and popular perceptions of 
entitlement to benefits after the fuel subsidy cuts, local governments faced 
mounting pressure to spread UCT benefits to more households. Drawing on 
continued savings flows from the subsidy reductions, the government was 
able to diffuse these social and political pressures directly by expanding the 
reach of the program. A basic political economy model suggests that the 
postcrisis Indonesian approach of gradual subsidy reductions coupled with 
compensation programs reduced the likelihood of the policy reversals that 
took place in several countries of the Middle East and North Africa, where 
governments attempted drastic subsidy cuts in one go. 
By most accounts, the UCT program prevented the sudden increase in 
poverty that many had predicted in the period leading up to October 2005. 
Nearly 27.1% of Indonesian households received UCT funds in late 2005, and 
the program was relatively well targeted to the poor. Targeting was more pro-
poor, however, in urban areas where 28.2% of program benefits reached the 
poorest decile compared to only 17.5% in rural areas. This differential reflects 
the relative ease of targeting in urban areas where the distinction between 
poor and nonpoor is more striking than in rural areas, where the majority of 
poor Indonesians reside. The program reached 55.6% of households in the 
poorest decile and 39.4% in the second poorest decile.  
The government has subsequently justified the targeting outcomes on 
the grounds that the program aimed to reach not only poor households but 
also those vulnerable to poverty. Between February 2005 and March 2006, 
that is, the period during which the BBM subsidy was cut on two occasions, 
56.5% of initially poor households remained poor, 19.4% moved to near-poor, 
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17.7% to near-nonpoor, and 6.5 escaped poverty altogether, moving to 
nonpoor. Meanwhile, only 6% of nonpoor households in February 2005 
became poor or near-poor a year later. The UCT funds constituted a 
significant proportion of monthly expenditures for the poorest households 
covering 24% of average monthly household expenditures in rural areas and 
17% in urban areas among households in the poorest decile. Furthermore, 
survey evidence suggests that for certain households, the funds were 
sufficient to cover not only consumption goods but also some health and 
education expenditures. 
The UCT program addressed three fundamental concerns: (i) to ensure 
that poor households do not fall deeper into poverty as a result of income and 
purchasing power shocks; (ii) to protect near- and nonpoor households from 
slipping into poverty; and (iii) to promote welfare improvements among poor 
households, pushing them to higher expenditure gradients. Today, the 
challenge is to integrate an incentive structure into the transfer program in 
order to generate and maintain the human capital investments vital for 
sustained growth and poverty reduction. Careful restructuring of existing 
targeting and transfer arrangements will be required to secure the potential 
gains of a more equitable and efficient cash transfer program. 
SMERU conducted two impact evaluations of the UCT. The first was a 
rapid appraisal undertaken in Jakarta several days after the first payment 
period (Hastuti et al 2006a), and the second was conducted in December 
2005 in five districts across the country (Hastuti et al 2006b). SMERU’s 
evaluation finds that targeting at the subdistrict level was quite accurate while 
the most significant mistargeting took place at the household level. The main 
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causes of mistargeting were local capture by relatively well-off households 
connected to local officials and weak proxy indicators in the household 
survey. This was the first time that proxy means tests were used to target 
poor households in a national Social Safety Net—SSN (JPS) program. 
Although the 14-variable proxy used by official enumerators moved beyond 
the limitations of previous BKKBN targeting criteria, they ultimately failed to 
capture sufficient variation between poor and nonpoor households, 
particularly in areas where there was a concentration of households around 
the poverty line. 
Whilst these evaluations found that UCT was helpful in assisting the 
poor to mitigate the impact of reduced fuel subsidies, the program suffered 
problems both in its design and implementation. In terms of design, the main 
weaknesses revolved around a weak socialization campaign; the lack of clear 
role for local governments in the program; problematic targeting methodology; 
and the lack of any transparent complaints mechanism. In terms of 
implementation, there was evidence that the household census enumerators 
only visited households that had been identified as poor by local authorities. 
This has caused the program to suffer both leakage and undercoverage, as 
shown in an example in Table 4 which describes such a simple benefit 
incidence analysis.  
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Table 4. UCT Recipients in Kedondong Village, Demak, 2005 
UCT Beneficiary by Quintile 
Distribution of UCT 
(Percent) Quintile Percent N 
Q1 74.5 205 42.0 
Q2 45.0 125 25.6 
Q3 28.3 78 16.0 
Q4 21.3 59 12.1 
Q5 7.6 21 4.3 
Total 35.3 488 100.0 
Village population: 1,383 households 
Quintile size: 275-278 households 
Source: Hastuti et al (2005b) 
Table 4 shows the distribution of UCT in Kedondong village, where 
SMERU collected data on the welfare rank of each household using 
Community-Based Monitoring System (CBMS). Treating those in the first and 
second quintiles as poor households, the table shows that only 60% (375 
household out of 550 in the first two quintiles) of the poor in the village 
received the transfer, indicating undercoverage, while 33% (last column of 
Table 4 of the benefit was leaked to nonpoor households. During 
implementation, meanwhile, there was some evidence that local authorities 
required recipients to give them a proportion of the transfer. 
In 2007, the UCT program has been replaced with a conditional cash 
transfer (CCT). There are two types of the CCT delivery mechanisms, one is 
distributed through the community and the other is directly transferred to 
beneficiary households through the post office. The community CCT is 
intended to improve the infrastructure, particularly for those which are needed 
to support the service delivery of health and education, while the household 
CCT, which is better known as Program Keluarga Harapan—PKH, is intended 
to ensure that poor beneficiary households have access to basic health and 
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education services, particularly for mothers and children. Currently, the CCT 
is being piloted in seven provinces in Indonesia, namely DKI Jakarta, West 
Java, East Java, West Sumatra, North Sulawesi, Gorontalo, and East Nusa 
Tenggara. At pilot stage, the PKH covered around 500,000 chronically poor 
households. 
The PKH provides direct cash assistance to poor families when 
certain conditions are fulfilled, e.g., children are enrolled in and attend school, 
infants are weighted and vaccinated, and expecting mothers get appropriate 
prenatal care. However, the success of this program is such a challenge. This 
requires the guarantee of good coordination between ministries and 
associated institutions, as well as between central and regional governments. 
Monitoring is another key of success for this program implementation. In Latin 
American countries, the CCT program is sometimes directly supervised by the 
President’s office to ensure the strong political support. Furthermore, advance 
preparations of required facilities and infrastructure need to be made (Alatas, 
2007). 
b. School Operational Assistance (BOS) 
School Operational Assistance (or Program Bantuan Operasional 
Sekolah—BOS) is a program for primary and junior high school levels and is 
intended to reduce the burden on the community, especially the poor, of the 
costs of education after the BBM (fuel) price rose. Different from the previous 
PKPS-BBM that had been provided in the form of scholarships for students 
from poor family background, known as Bantuan Khusus Murid—BKM or 
Special Assistance for Students program, BOS was provided for schools. In 
the BKM program, the number of poor students who received BKM was 
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determined by the central government based on the poverty index. In the 
2004-2005 academic year, BKM was provided to approximately 20% of 
primary school students and 24% of junior high school students, with a 
scholarship value of Rp60,000 per semester per primary school student and 
Rp120,000 per semester per junior high student. Each school received a 
particular quota and undertook the selection of students who were eligible 
recipients; and the BKM funds were then disbursed directly to the selected 
student via an appointed post office. 
The BOS program adopted a different approach than the BKM 
program in the sense that the funds were not provided directly to the poor 
students but were granted for and managed by schools. BOS funds were 
allocated on the basis of the number of students, with an amount of 
Rp235,000 per student per annum at the primary school (SD) level and 
Rp324,500 per student per annum at the junior high school (SMP) level. The 
APBN allocation to BOS funds for the period of July–December 2005 was 
Rp5.136 trillion, or an approximate eightfold increase over the BKM budget for 
primary and junior high schools in the period of January–June 2005 (Suharyo 
et al 2006). 
The main objective of BOS is to enable schools to abolish tuition fees. 
Between July and December 2005, 40 million students were not required to 
pay tuition. In addition to making schooling more affordable, BOS also aims to 
ensure that schools have the sufficient resources to retain top teachers, 
provide sufficient educational materials, and ensure that students do not leave 
school before graduating from junior secondary level. 
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SMERU was commissioned by Bappenas to evaluate BOS. The study 
evaluated three aspects of BOS: its impact on schools, on students in 
general, and on poor students. In terms of its impact on schools, BOS did 
allow teachers to improve the quality of their teaching by providing better 
equipment and teaching materials. Also, funds were used to supplement 
teacher’s income and pay for extracurricular activities. The impact on 
students, meanwhile, was clear, such as reduced or free tuition, cheaper 
textbooks, and reduction in other fees related to extracurricular activities 
provided by the school. Finally, SMERU found that while only a small 
proportion of schools actually give special treatment to poor students; it has 
nevertheless increased the motivation of the poor students to continue 
schooling.  
However, there is still some room for improvement. Firstly, there is 
little evidence that BOS has reduced school attrition rates, especially at the 
junior secondary level. Secondly, school teachers who are also school 
treasurers now spend more time administering BOS, rather than teaching. 
This is also often the case for school principals. In addition, there has been 
manipulation of funds and reduced community participation in the day-to-day 
operations of schools (Suharyo et al 2006). 
c. Community-Driven Development: KDP-UPP and PNPM 
The central government has been driving two large community-driven 
development (CDD) projects: the Kecamatan Development Program/KDP 
(Program Pengembangan Kecamatan—PPK) and the Urban Poverty 
Project/UPP (Program Pemberantasan Kemiskinan Perkotaan—P2KP). The 
two programs have a similar basic design, both giving block grants to each 
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area. They differ in so far as that KDP is implemented in rural subdistricts, 
while UPP is implemented in urban areas. KDP began in 1998, a year earlier 
than UPP, and its coverage has gone from 2,000 villages during the initial 
implementation to currently 34,000 villages. KDP is one of the world's largest 
CDD programs in the world, with a budget of $760 million. Both KDP and UPP 
have two main components: small rotating credit and an infrastructure 
improvement fund. For both programs, the focus is on community 
participation, which ranges from town hall meetings to decide which 
infrastructure projects should be undertaken to actually working together in 
carrying out the physical work.  
The University of Indonesia (2002) conducted an evaluation of KDP 
and found several problems.8 Firstly, local bureaucracy often dominates 
community meetings and impedes real community involvement. This leads to 
significant local capture in deciding the infrastructure projects and, after the 
project is completed, an unwillingness of the community to maintain the 
project. Secondly, the study found that poor families have less access to the 
rotating credit. Thirdly, those receiving credit are not given technical 
assistance to ensure that the funds are used effectively. Finally, there is often 
a lack of financial transparency from those in charge of the block grant. 
In contrast to the largely negative tone of the University of Indonesia 
report on KDP, World Bank (2004) claims that UPP helps to increase 
democracy at the local level, increases participation, and provides access to 
credits to poor families.9 Overall, Bappenas found both KDP and UPP to be 
                                                 
8
 See World Bank (2006b). 
9
 See University of Indonesia (2002). 
 - 38 - 
much more cost effective from a budgetary point of view in terms of 
constructing and managing infrastructures (Bappenas 2005). It found that 
KDP was 55% cheaper than contractor-executed construction for similar 
infrastructure projects, while UPP was 66% cheaper. 
In 2007, the GoI launched a National Community Empowerment 
Program (Program National Pemberdayaan Masyarakat––PNPM), a scaling 
up of KDP and UPP, which mainly consists of infrastructure projects. The 
PNPM is developed following the success of Community-Driven Development 
(CDD) programs, such as KDP and UPP. Besides producing a high economic 
internal rate of return—between 38.6% and 67.6%—these programs also 
managed to reduce development costs as has been mentioned. This program 
focuses on communities’ priorities and needs in order to create a higher 
sense of ownership. 
There are three principles that need to be carefully adhered to in the 
implementation of PNPM: (i) the community is the actor not the object of the 
development project (in every process, from planning, implementation, 
maintenance, and monitoring); (ii) transparency of fund allocation and 
extensive information dissemination; and (iii) funds are directly channeled to 
communities in order to reduce the probability of leakages (Alatas, 2007). 
PNPM is intended to cover all subdistricts (kecamatan) in 2009 and 
will be evaluated annually. In addition, PNPM is also targeted to create 5 
million jobs in 50,000 villages. Meanwhile, the total budget of PNPM until 
2009 is around Rp14.3 trillion in 2007. The program still fully duplicates KDP 
and UPP, but there will be fine-tuning in 2008. Due to the presence of PNPM, 
KDP will continue to 2009, while UPP will continue until 2015. 
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V. Lesson Learned and Concluding Remarks 
The JPS programs prevented the monetary crisis of 1997–1998 from 
creating the losses in welfare that would have been expected in a situation of 
rapid decline in purchasing power and widespread unemployment. With a 
very limited initial institutional foundation for formal social protection 
programs, the government utilized existing village-level institutions including 
BKKBN cadres, health centre administrators, school committees, and local 
government officials to implement education, health, community 
empowerment, and rice subsidy programs. Participation in all of the JPS 
programs, except for the small nutrition component of the health programs 
and subsidized credit programs, helped to increase household consumption. 
The OPK was particularly effective in ensuring staple food intake among poor 
households. Despite considerable undercoverage, the JPS scholarship and 
block grant program helped to sustain enrollment at precrisis levels and may 
have even reduced the time allocated to employment by children of school 
age. 
A major feature of the initial JPS programs was the heterogeneity of 
targeting performance across programs and regions. The major factors 
contributing to variation in program outcomes include differences in (i) 
program design; (ii) the scale of budget allocations across regions; and (iii) 
local institutional capacity. In the early stages of the OPK, more than half of all 
poor households in Indonesia reported receiving the benefits of this program, 
while more than a third of nonpoor households also reported receiving 
benefits. 
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When targeting mechanisms are being designed, it should be kept in 
mind that the vulnerable and the chronic poor may respond differently to 
different types of welfare-enhancing interventions. The actual sources of 
vulnerability ultimately matter most when designing effective interventions. On 
one hand, vulnerability due to low mean consumption prospects, which tends 
to predominate in rural areas, might best be addressed through cash transfer 
programs. On the other hand, vulnerability due to consumption fluctuations, 
which is a relatively more common finding among the urban population, might 
best be addressed through interventions aimed at consumption smoothing. 
In the final analysis, improvements in targeting will require not only finer 
methodological innovations but also strong political will and public institutional 
support. 
The PKPS-BBM programs were built on the lessons of previous 
programs. Given the large and flexible budget funded primarily by flows of 
savings due to BBM subsidy reductions, the PKPS-BBM programs achieved a 
degree of national coverage that was not possible for the JPS programs. This 
achievement established credibility among stakeholders at all levels of 
government. In terms of management and implementation, program outcomes 
depend on whether: the distribution of funds is timely, the program is well 
coordinated horizontally and vertically, and the program is sufficiently and 
properly socialized. 
The most valuable lessons from Indonesia’s JPS programs include 
the following: First, informal coping mechanisms complement formal social 
interventions but are independently insufficient to mitigate the worst effects of 
a major shock or crisis. Thus, real spending on formal JPS programs must 
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rise unambiguously during periods of crisis or induced shocks. Second, long-
term poverty alleviation and development strategies are not suitable as JPS 
programs during a crisis. Even programs such as a CCT might not be 
sufficient to act as a safety net to prevent poor and near-poor households 
from falling more deeply into poverty. The institutional structure developed 
through a CCT program, however, would support rapid appraisals and social 
interventions during crises. In particular, microcredit programs are not suitable 
as social protection programs. Not only are new microenterprises unlikely to 
be successful during a crisis, but also the hurried expansion of credit can 
undermine the slow, patient, and painstaking groundwork that successful 
microcredit programs require. Third, there is evidence that the current 
targeting system has a weak methodology, which is often the case with top-
down programs like UCT, rather than programs that involve the community in 
one way or another, as CDD do. Therefore, it may be worth exploring ways to 
increase community participation rather than having a top-down targeting 
system. Fourth, the second lesson is in terms of coordination, both between 
central and local governments and between line ministries in the central 
government. The rules and regulations of a program must be well-designed 
and the duties of each ministry should be made explicit to avoid confusion. 
Fifth, given that Indonesia now adheres to a decentralized government 
system, the central government should refrain from implementing large-scale 
programs like the UCT, but rather play a more supporting role and let the local 
governments decide the best programs for their residents.  
In conclusion, it is important to note that significant progress has been 
made on poverty reduction in Indonesia since the 1998 crisis. The 
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government is increasingly willing to make program improvements based on 
rigorous and independent impact evaluation studies, more budget is allocated 
for poverty reduction programs, and poverty reduction strategy papers are 
now “produced” by involving civil society. However, the state of poverty in 
Indonesia is still far from being resolved, as widespread vulnerability to 
poverty remains and there is uneven progress towards several Millennium 
Development Goals, particularly in maternal health. Poverty remains a crucial 
issue in Indonesia and our efforts must improve both in quality and quantity, to 
ensure that Indonesians are free from chronic poverty. Among others, poverty 
reduction programs should be more focused on human development and 
capacity building and provide greater multiplier effects in the future. In a 
broader concept, efforts to reduce poverty should be inline with the concern of 
promoting human security that has been placed as international concern.  
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